德勤－复旦会计论坛系列250期讲座
时间：2025年 5月20日（周二）下午1:30
地点：史带楼304教室
主持人: 张金萍 青年副研究员
报告人: 程林（中欧国际工商学院）
题 目: Strategic Disclosure of Hiring Information and Insider Trading: Evidence from Job Postings
摘 要: Using a near-universe sample of job postings from 2010 to 2020, we find that managers disclose good news of job demand before insider trading so that they could sell securities in higher price immediately following the disclosure. However, we do not find such strategic behavior before insider purchases. We further show that the baseline effects are accentuated for managers with more incentives to exploit trading profits and more discretions in information disclosure, but attenuated for firms with higher proprietary costs and labor market frictions, and better governance efficacy. Additional tests show that insiders disclose higher level of human capital investment during insider trading but do not actually hire, and they engage in a two-pronged approach to manipulate both accruals and job postings to maximize trading profits. However, investors can uncover the ploy if insiders frequently manipulate job postings. Our findings are robust to several sensitivity checks, including the difference-in-differences research design, different matching methods, alternative measures, trading windows, and samples.
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