管理科学系学术讲座（4月15日）

时   间：2025年4月15日（周二） 15:30-17:00

地   点：管理学院政立院区A401教室

主题：Sequential Voting and the Condorcet Jury Theorem

主讲人：陈礴 华威大学教授

主持人：张显东 复旦大学管理学院教授

Abstract:

This study revisits Condorcet's Jury Theorem (CJT) by analyzing the reliability of group decisions under sequential versus simultaneous voting structures. Condorcet's original theorem posits that increasing the size of a jury leads to increasingly reliable majority decisions, approaching a probability of 1 for a correct verdict, provided jurors vote simultaneously and independently with homogeneous competence. Our research challenges this by examining sequential voting, where jurors vote in turn and are aware of preceding votes. We demonstrate that sequential voting introduces herding behaviour, which limits the reliability of large juries and prevents it from converging to 100%. For small juries with heterogeneous competence, we show that voting order significantly impacts reliability. Specifically, positioning the most competent juror second optimizes decision reliability. With this optimal ordering, sequential voting is at least as reliable as simultaneous voting, and it outperforms simultaneous voting when juror competence is sufficiently heterogeneous. Our analysis reveals important implications for organizational decision-making, highlighting how voting structure and voter heterogeneity critically influence the reliability of collective judgment.

Bio:

陈礴：英国社会科学院院士，运筹学会 (ORS) 会士，数学及其应用学会 (IMA) 会士。英国华威大学教授。自2006年起为诺贝尔经济学奖提名专家。曾获1997年英国经济与社会研究基金会管理学研究奖，2007年英国工程与物理科学研究基金会科学与创新奖。他的主要研究方向包括组合最优化、调度与运输、博弈论与机制设计。