德勤－复旦会计论坛系列244期讲座

时间：2025年 3月14日（周五）下午1:30

地点：史带楼301教室

题目: Strategic Salary Disclosure in Talent Acquisition: Evidence from the AI Labor Market

报告人: Rebecca N. Hann（University of Maryland）

主持人：朱振梅 副教授

摘 要:

This study examines employers’ strategic decisions to voluntarily disclose salary information in job postings and the impact of such disclosure on talent acquisition. Using detailed job posting and employment profile data for a comprehensive sample of AI positions, we find that while firms facing greater labor market competition are more likely to disclose salary information, those facing a higher risk of revealing proprietary information, internal pay disparities, or less competitive pay are more likely to withhold it. Moreover, we find that AI positions with disclosed salaries tend to take longer to fill. This effect is more pronounced for positions at smaller firms, those requiring generative AI skills, and those offering higher pay. Additional analysis shows that firms disclosing salary information experience a significant increase in web traffic to their career websites, suggesting that the extended vacancy duration is driven in part by salary disclosure attracting a larger pool of applicants. We further find a negative association between salary disclosure rate and subsequent employee turnover. Taken together, our findings suggest that employers strategically weigh the costs and benefits of salary disclosure to attract talent in competitive labor markets. While such disclosure may lengthen the hiring process due to increased applicant volume, it increases the likelihood of finding the right match.

会计学系

2025-3-11