德勤－复旦会计论坛系列223-224期讲座信息

时间：2024年5月7日（周二）下午13:30

地点：史带楼602

题目：The Role of Analyst Competition in the Process of Stock Market Liberalization

报告人：侯宇副教授 (Queen’s University)

主持人：张新教授

摘要：

In this study, we investigate the impact of China's stock market liberalization on the performance of domestic analysts. We posit that the influx of foreign analysts postliberalization intensifies competition among analysts, leading to more accurate and less biased forecasts by domestic analysts. Utilizing a difference-in-differences methodology, we show an improvement in forecast quality of domestic analysts post-liberalization, especially in environments with lower initial competition, higher foreign analyst skill, and greater pre-liberalization information uncertainty. The improvement is also shown to be mediated by increased effort by domestic analysts, consistent with the notion of intensified competition. These findings reveal an alternative mechanism by which market liberalization enhances market efficiency, and stress the role of competitive dynamics in enhancing market information environments, particularly in markets with weak law enforcement.

德勤－复旦会计论坛系列224期讲座信息

时间：2024年5月9日（周四）下午13:30

地点：史带楼205

题目：The Role of Analyst Competition in the Process of Stock Market Liberalization

报告人：罗颐助理教授 (Western University)

主持人：张新教授

摘要：

This paper evaluates the effectiveness of Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB), the independent Canadian audit regulator charged with improving audit quality in Canada. I exploit a unique setting where a subset of Canadian audit engagements is subject to joint inspection by CPAB and the U.S. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), and develop ex ante expectations for CPAB’s inspection outcomes based on regulatory capture theory (Dal Bó, 2006; Stigler, 1971). Using hand collected data from CPAB and PCAOB, I find that CPAB reports a significantly lower deficiency rate and fewer areas of deficiency than PCAOB for Canadian Big 4 accounting firms but reports similar deficiency rates indistinguishable from PCAOB’s for non-Big 4 firms. I further find that CPAB’s inspection reports disclose less information than PCAOB’s. This study provides new evidence on behaviour of a non-US audit regulator and has implications for auditing researchers and practitioners.