德勤－复旦会计论坛系列讲座之一百九十七
时 间：2023年 4月25日（周二）上午10:00
地 点：史601教室
主持人：张金萍 青年副研究员
报告人: David H Erkens, Professor (China Europe International Business School)
题 目：How Flexible Targets Retain Balance in Managerial Actions
摘 要：Why do firms use flexible performance targets that undermine business unit managers’ commitment toward achieving beginning-of-period targets? We argue that this occurs because adjusting unachievable targets downward helps firms preserve balanced effort allocations between substitutable tasks. We test our theory using a unique dataset from a large bakery chain that switched from evaluating managers against flexible to fixed financial targets. Inconsistent with the firm’s objective of improving goal commitment, financial performance decreased rather than increased after the switch. Sales, however, decreased much more than productivity. Consistent with this resulting from unbalanced effort allocations, we show that fixed targets encouraged managers to reduce part-time work hours when the beginning-of-period sales target became unachievable. An examination of stores that had previously benefited most from target adjustments, losses from unsold inventory, discretionary sales-related expenses, and overall store profits confirms that increased target rigidity encouraged managers to opportunistically sacrifice sales to increase productivity.
会计学系
2023-4-21
-
活动讲座
-
新闻动态
-
微信头条
-
招生咨询
-
媒体视角
-
瞰见云课堂
