管科系系列讲座第237-238期预告

管科系系列讲座第237期预告

时　间：2019年6月4日（周二）13:30

地　点：史带楼410

主持人：戴悦教授

主讲嘉宾：Baojun Jiang is an associate professor of marketing at the Olin Business School at Washington University in St. Louis.

Title：The Bright Side of the Primary Retail Platform’s Control of the Resale Market

Abstract: Consumers can buy firsthand concert tickets from primary platforms (e.g., Ticketmaster). If they later find themselves unable to attend the concert, they can resell their tickets to other consumers on resale platforms (e.g., StubHub). Recently, Ticketmaster has also been developing its resale business and attempting to control the resale market by blocking consumers from reselling on competing resale platforms. Many states in the U.S. have passed laws requiring consumers be allowed to freely resell tickets on any resale sites, worrying that Ticketmaster’s control of both the primary and the resale markets will lead to increases in its service fees in both markets, which will reduce consumer surplus. However, our game-theoretic framework shows that the opposite can happen: when Ticketmaster also controls the resale market, the service fees on both the primary and the resale markets can decrease, increasing the consumer surplus. This is because Ticketmaster tends to lower the primary-market service fee to attract more buyers in the primary market. Hence, more consumers will also be expected to resell their tickets, which increase the resale market profit. Ticketmaster also tends to lower the resale-market service fee to make ticket-reselling less costly, which induces more consumers to buy tickets from the primary market. We also find that, counterintuitively, when the primary platform controls the resale market, the presence of a small group of scalpers can reduce the final ticket prices and increase the musician’s profit and the consumer surplus. Using data from Ticketmaster.com and StubHub.com, we provide some suggestive empirical support for our theoretical predictions.

管科系系列讲座第238期预告

时　间：2019年6月4日（周二）14:30

地　点：史带楼410

主持人：戴悦教授

主讲嘉宾：Baojun Jiang is an associate professor of marketing at the Olin Business School at Washington University in St. Louis.

Title：Consumer Fairness Concerns and Dynamic Pricing in a Channel

Abstract: The extant literature has well documented consumers’ fairness concerns. For example, when a firm charges a higher price than what’s considered fair (a reference point), some consumers may experience some psychological disutility when buying from the firm. This paper studies a channel where the retailer faces a segment of consumers who have fairness concerns about retail price increases. We analyze a growing market where, in each of the two periods, the manufacturer sells its product at a wholesale price to the retailer, which chooses its retail prices dynamically. However, if the retailer raises its second-period price, the second-period demand will experience a drop in the segment of consumers with fairness concerns.  Our analysis reveals several interesting findings. First, the presence of consumers with fairness concerns tends to make the manufacturer increase its first-period wholesale price and reduce its second-period wholesale price.  Second, the presence of consumers with fairness concerns can in equilibrium reduce both the first-period and second-period retail prices. Third, an increase in the market growth rate can lead to a decrease in retail and wholesale prices in both periods. Fourth, consumer fairness concerns can result in an all-win situation for the manufacturer, the retailer, and the consumers. The existence of a segment of consumers with fairness concerns can allow the retailer to lower its first-period price, which in essence helps the retailer to commit to not significantly raising its second-period price, which in turn gives the manufacturer incentive to lower its second-period wholesale price, making pricing in the channel more efficient.

管理科学系

2019-5-28