管科系系列讲座第181期预告

时间：2017年3月28日（周二）13:30

地点：史带楼303

主持人：张显东教授

主讲嘉宾：Professor Bo Chen (Ph.D., D.Sc.), Chair of Operational Research & Management Science, Warwick Business School, University of Warwick; fellow of the UK Operational Research Society.

Title：Elicitation of Expert Opinions via Voting

Abstract:

An organization wishes to determine the more likely of two states of Nature (such as “Innocent” or “Guilty” on a criminal trial).It will follow the majority “voting” of an odd number of experts (which we call a jury) or unanimous voting on one of the two states (say, “Guilty”). The experts vote either sequentially or simultaneously, while in both cases they vote honestly (i.e., each votes for the state he believes to be the more likely). The experts are heterogeneous in their “ability”, the quality of their private information, and they cannot directly communicate their private information, but instead can only vote between the two states, so that later voters know the votes of earlier ones in sequential voting.

We focus on the case where the size of the jury is three, which finds many applications in practice (e.g., a common situation for a tribunal of three judges, three-man juries in boxing), and we are concerned with maximizing the verdict reliability, i.e., probability that the jury verdict is correct.

In this talk, I will present our major findings to answer the following questions:

·         If jury verdict is by majority on sequential voting, what is the optimal voting order if any?

·         If jury verdict is by unanimity on sequential voting, what is the optimal voting order if any?

·         Which voting mechanism is better, sequential or simultaneous?

·         Can these two mechanisms with honest voting ever be (strategically) optimal?

·         Which of the two ability profiles of the experts delivers better reliability of verdict, higher homogeneity or higher heterogeneity?

(Joint work with Steven Alpern)

管理科学系

2017-3-22