4月18日现代产业经济学系列讲座第103期

时间：2012年4月18日（周三）14:00–15:30

地点：复旦大学管理学院（国顺路670号）思源楼326

演讲嘉宾：Dr. Satoru Takahashi，Department of Economics, Princeton University

主题：Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

主持人：产业经济系 龚冰琳博士

嘉宾简介: Dr. Satoru Takahashi received his Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University and has since worked at Princeton University as an assistant professor in Economics. His research areas include microeconomic theory and auction theory. He has published widely on top economic journals including Econometrica, Journal of Economic Theory, and Games and Economic Behavior, among others.

Abstract: Players coordinate continuation play in repeated games with public monitoring. This paper asks the robustness of such equilibrium play with respect to private monitoring perturbations that are exante close to the public-monitoring structure. We show that, in two-player games with full support of public signals, no perfect public equilibrium is robust to private-monitoring perturbations if it induces a “regular” 2×2 coordination game in the continuation play. This regularity condition is violated in all belief-free equilibria and in particular, repetitions of static equilibria. Indeed, we show that, in two-player games with an individual rank condition on public signals, every interior belief-free equilibrium is robust to private-monitoring perturbations. We also analyze the robustness of block belief-free equilibria and point out that the notion of robustness is sensitive to the requirement that every private signal be interpreted as some public signal with probability 1, and not with probability close to 1.

产业经济学系

2012年4月17日